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PRISON CONDITIONS AND THE DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD UNDER THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT: WILSON V.
SEITER 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)
The Eighth Amendment of the United States' Constitution forbids
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.' The purpose behind
the Eighth Amendment is to limit the power of those responsible for
criminal enforcement2 and to protect persons convicted of crimes.3
Historically, claims protected by the Eighth Amendment involved
physical punishment and the infliction of pain.' Courts have recently
1. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
Only conduct classified as punishment is actionable under the Eighth Amendment;
therefore, the definition of punishment is important to Eighth Amendment analysis.
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991). The definition of punishment is "[a]ny
fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the
judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Robert A. West, Comment, Constitutional Law: Quelling a Prison Riot: Cruel
and Unusual Punishment or a Necessary Infliction of Pain? [Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.
Ct. 1078 (1986)], 26 WASHBURN L.J. 208, 209 (1986).
3. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The Supreme Court determined
that the framers of the Constitution designed the Eighth Amendment to protect only
those convicted of crimes. Id. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-45(1981) (finding that the conditions of a criminal's confinement in a prison are subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (declaring
that substandard medical care for imprisoned criminals is subject to Eighth Amend-
ment scrutiny). "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has
complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal pros-
ecutions." Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
n. 16 (1979) (holding that due process mandates that a pretrial detainee is free from
punishment; therefore, the Eighth Amendment is not the proper vehicle to seek redress
before sentencing).
4. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,464 (1947) (finding
that the second attempt to execute a prisoner, after the first attempt failed because of
mechanical problems, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910) (holding that hard and painful labor per-
formed in chains amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
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expanded the application of the Eighth Amendment beyond its tradi-
tional bounds.' Prisoners have utilized the modem expansion of the
Eighth Amendment to challenge the conditions of their confinement.6
As a result, prisoners bringing a successful Eighth Amendment claim
can obtain healthier and safer conditions during the course of their
incarceration.7 In Wilson v. Seiter,8 the Supreme Court articulated the
standard under which a prisoner may bring a successful Eighth
Amendment claim, holding that prisoners arguing that the conditions
of their confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment have the
burden of showing that prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" 9
5. Stephen J. Durkin, Comment, Rhodes v. Chapman: Prison Overcrowding -
Evolving Standards Evading an Increasing Problem, 8 NEw ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 249,
252-57 (1982) (outlining the development of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to
demonstrate its expansion from a protection only against physical punishment to a pro-
tection against a wider array of subtle punishments).
6. Ellen K. Lawson, Comment, Extending Deference to Prison Officials Under the
Eighth Amendment: Whitley v. Albers, 32 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 231, 231
n.3 (1987) (stating that federal courts now apply the Eighth Amendment equally to the
acts of punishment inflicted upon specific individuals and the general conditions of
prison confinement). See Deborah A. Montick, Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unu-
sual Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining the Totality of Approach, 26 How. L.J.
227, 229 (1983) (stating that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ap-
plies to general conditions of confinement in state prisons).
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), the Supreme Court first addressed the
limitation that the Eighth Amendment imposes upon the conditions under which a state
may imprison those convicted of crimes. Id. at 344-45. The Rhodes Court considered
the combined impact of the conditions of confinement to determine whether those con-
ditions were cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id. at 346. The Court concluded that conditions of confinement amount to cruel
and unusual punishment only if the conditions inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain or
were grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes warranting imprisonment.
Id.
7. Lawson, supra note 6, at 23 1.
8. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
9. Id. at 2327. The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment contains an intent
requirement. Id. at 2325. "If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment
by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the
inflicting officer before it can qualify" as an Eighth Amendment violation. Id.
The United States, in its amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioner, opposed the
intent requirement. Id. at 2526. The government contended that prison officials will
claim that, despite their efforts to provide humane conditions, budgetary constraints
render the achievement of ideal conditions impossible. Id. However, the Court con-
cluded that budgetary constraints do not affect the finding of cruel and unusual condi-
tions, reasoning that whether or not the conditions are unconstitutional is a separate
issue from whether the prison systems can afford to rectify them. Id. A detailed discus-
sion of the components of the "deliberate indifference" standard is beyond the scope of
this Comment; however, see infra notes 17, 43, 44, and 70 for a brief description of
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to those conditions.10
In Wilson, petitioner alleged that the conditions of his incarceration
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.' He filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the respondents, the Director of the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction and the warden of the prison in which
Wilson was incarcerated.12 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the respon-
dents. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the
ground that the prisoners failed to raise a reasonable inference of the
prison officials' "obduracy and wantonness,"' 4 the state of mind neces-
sary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.' 5 The United States
some of the "deliberate indifference" components. See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-05 (1976) (holding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of pris-
oners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment").
10. 111 S. Ct. at 2326. The Court, as well as all parties involved, agreed that the
high standard employed in Whitley v. Albers was inapplicable to prison condition cases.
Id. In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), (the Court held that guards reacting to a
prison disturbance must act "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of caus-
ing harm" to violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Id. at 320-21. Instead of
applying the Whitley standard the Wilson Court first determined whether the chal-
lenged conduct was sufficiently harmful to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim. Ill S. Ct. at 2326. Second, the Court focused on the constraints
facing the prison official in considering whether the conduct was wanton. Id. at 2326.
11. 111 S. Ct. at 2322-23. "The complaint alleged overcrowding, excessive noise,
insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation,
unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation,
and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates." Id. at 2323.
12. Id. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
For a more detailed discussion of the procedure involved in filing a § 1983 claim to
challenge confinement conditions, see Lawson, supra note 6, at 234-35.
13. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 1990). The petitioner alleged that
the prison officials took no remedial action after notification of the challenged condi-
tions. Id. at 862.
The district court applied the "obduracy and wantonness" standard. Id. at 863 (rely-
ing on Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Viewing the affidavits in light of
that standard, the district court concluded that the petitioners' failure to demonstrate
wantonness indicated the absence of any issue of material fact. 893 F.2d at 863.
14. Id. at 867.
15. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a number of
1992]
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Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for recon-
sideration under the appropriate standard.1 6
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that a petitioner
challenging the conditions of confinement must show a culpable state
of mind on the part of prison officials to prevail on an Eighth Amend-
ment claim. 7 The Court articulated a more lenient standard, however,
and required that the prisoner show that the prison officials acted with
"deliberate indifference" toward the challenged conditions.18
Theoretically, the term "cruel and unusual punishment"19 prohib-
ited the infliction of excessive or disproportionate punishment or pain
on criminals.2" More recently, courts have expanded Eighth Amend-
claims on the ground that, even if proven, the claims did not involve the serious consti-
tutional deprivation mandated by Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). Id. at 864-
65. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rhodes. The Court
of Appeals then affirmed the district court on the remaining claims because the peti-
tioner failed to prove the level of culpability established by the Court in Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 893 F.2d at 866-67. See infra notes 58-66 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Whitley.
On certiorari before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that a court may not
dismiss any challenged condition as long as other alleged conditions continue to be in
dispute because each condition contributes to the totality of the challenged conditions.
111 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court stated that the petitioner's position reflected a misappli-
cation of the holding in Rhodes. Id. The Wilson Court interpreted Rhodes as providing
that Eighth Amendment violations may combine to have a mutually enforcing effect
only if they produce the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need. Id. In Wil-
son, the petitioner failed to identify any single human need. Id. The Court stated that
"[n]othing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unu-
sual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Id. at
2327. Compare Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
denial of outdoor exercise and fresh air is unconstitutional if prisoners are confined to
small cells) with Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that a depri-
vation of outdoor exercise for prisoners was constitutional because the prisoners had
access to various indoor activities during a substantial portion of each day).
16. 111 S. Ct. at 2328.
17. Id. at 2326.
18. Id. at 2326-27. The Court applied the same "deliberate indifference" standard
articulated in an earlier prison case, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Id. See
infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Estelle. See also LaFaut v.
Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that Estelle's "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard is the level of scrutiny applicable for an Eighth Amendment inquiry).
19. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983) (quoting the English Bill of
Rights, which provided, "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive fines
imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted"), I Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch.2
(1689).
20. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (stating that the Eighth Amend-
ment's "cruel and unusual" clause was taken directly from the English Declaration of
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ment protection to encompass infliction of pain that is not specifically
part of the sentence, but rather is a consequence of confinement.21
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber22 was an early case which re-
quired that prisoners claiming a violation of their Eighth Amendment
rights establish a certain level of intent on the part of prison officials
who administered the punishment.2 3 In Resweber, prison officials
sought to electrocute a convicted prisoner a second time, after the first
attempt failed because of a mechanical error.24 The prisoner applied to
the Louisiana Supreme Court for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohi-
bition, and habeas corpus, claiming a violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.25 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari27 and concluded
that the language of the Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits the
wanton infliction of pain.2" However, the Court required that the
prison officials possess a culpable mental state to support a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment, regardless of the actual suffering in-
flicted.2 9 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the failure of the
Rights of 1688 to assure that the power to punish be exercised within civilized
boundaries).
21. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (stating that the denial
of medical care was a condition of confinement subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny);
Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that vermin infes-
tation, poor plumbing, unclean air, inadequate lighting, and safety hazards which were
conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Kirby v.
Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a cell which contained no
light, bedding, or toilet facilities cumulatively resulted in constitutional deprivation
under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause); Battle v. Anderson, 447 F.
Supp. 516, 525 (E.D. Okla. 1977) (stating that overcrowding in prison may amount to
an unconstitutional deprivation of health, safety, and security), aff'd, 564 F.2d 388
(10th Cir. 1977).
22. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. at 460-61.
25. Id. at 461. The prisoner alleged that the second attempt to execute him
amounted to both double jeopardy violative of the Fifth Amendment, and cruel and
unusual punishment, violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 461.
26. 329 U.S. at 461. The state court concluded that no law had been violated in
attempting to execute the prisoner a second time because no punishment sufficient to
cause death had been inflicted upon the prisoner. Id.
27. 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
28. 329 U.S. at 463. Petitioner asserted that the mental anguish resulting from the
preparation for more than one electrocution subjected him to lingering cruel and unu-
sual punishment. Id. at 464.
29. Id. The Court found that the second electrocution was not motivated by the
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
374 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:369
first attempt was not the fault of the prison officials,3° the officials
lacked the culpable mental state necessary to constitute a cruel method
of punishment.3 Therefore, the Court held that the punishment in-
flicted upon the prisoner did not warrant Eighth Amendment
protection.32
Gregg v. Georgia 33 is the precedential case prescribing the "unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain" standard.3 4 In Gregg, the Court
held that the imposition of the death penalty did not violate the Eighth
Amendment under all circumstances. 35 The Court promulgated a two-
prong inquiry to establish "excessiveness" constituting "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" 36: 1) whether prison officials inflicted "unnecessary
and wanton" pain for the purpose of punishment; 37 and 2) whether the
punishment inflicted is proportional to the crime committed.38 Apply-
desire of state prison officials to cause unnecessary pain. Id . Rather, the Court viewed
the prisoner to be the "unfortunate victim of this accident." Id The prisoner suffered
the same mental anguish and physical pain that he might have suffered had a fire oc-
curred in his cell block. Id. Absent a clear intent to inflict unnecessary pain upon the
prisoner, the Court found no violation of the prisoner's due process rights based on
cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 329 U.S. at 464.
33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34. Id. at 173. Gregg v. Georgia is generally cited as the source for the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain standard. West, supra note 2, at 213 n.31.
35. 428 U.S. at 187. The Court considered such factors as federalism, legislative
freedom, and moral consensus in finding that the Georgia death penalty did not violate
the United States Constitution. Id. at 186-87. The Court noted that the Georgia sen-
tencing procedures protected defendants by requiring specific jury findings regarding
the defendant's character or the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 198. Moreover, the
"Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed
on similarly situated defendants." Id. Therefore, Georgia prisoners sentenced to death
are ensured that their punishment is not disproportionate. Id.
36. Id. at 173.
37. Id. The Court has historically defined "unnecessary" in light of existing alter-
natives and the desired penalogical objectives. See, eg., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 392-93 (1972) (per curiam)(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (finding that punishment may
reach prohibitively cruel levels but that the Eighth Amendment explicitly prohibits
punishment reaching torturous levels); Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (asserting that "[a] punishment is excessive under [the excessive punishment] prin-
ciple if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot
comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of
suffering").
38. 428 U.S. at 173. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court
set forth three factors to aid in determining the constitutionality of a given sentence: (1)
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ing this standard, the Court held that the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual39 and that the punishment of death is not disproportionate to
the crime of murder.'
In Estelle v. Gamble,41 the Supreme Court relied upon the Resweber
and Gregg decisions in holding that the failure to provide proper medi-
cal care to inmates which caused unnecessary pain or suffering violated
the Eighth Amendment.42 In Estelle, doctors at the prison hospital
treated an inmate several times for complaints of serious back pain,
high blood pressure, and heart irregularities.43 Despite using drug
therapy, the doctors elected not to X-ray the prisoner.' The Court
found that the inadvertent failure to X-ray the prisoner did not rise to
the level of "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's medical needs.45
Therefore, the prisoner's claim failed to meet the constitutional requi-
the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the penalty that accompanies it; (2) a
comparison of sentences imposed within the same jurisdiction for similar crimes; and
(3) a comparison of sentences in other jurisdictions for similar crimes. Id. at 290-92.
39. 428 U.S. at 178.
40. Id. at 187.
41. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
42. Id. at 103-04. The Supreme Court reasoned that while incarcerated, prisoners
rely and depend upon prison officials for proper medical care. Id. at 103. If the govern-
ment chooses incarceration as a means of punishment, then the government has an
obligation to care for those prisoners. Id. Societal demands that prisoners not suffer a
deprivation of necessary medical care stems from the notion that the failure to provide
medical services serves no penological purposes. Id. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
447 (1890) (classifying punishment as cruel when involving torture or lingering death);
cf. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (asserting that the Court must inquire whether the punish-
ment conforms to human dignity). The Eighth Amendment derives its meaning from
the "evolving standards of decency" which are inherent in a "maturing society." Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
43. 429 U.S. at 99-101.
44. Id. at 107. Gamble refused to work due to excruciating pain. Id. at 100. As a
result, prison officials warned the prisoner that if he did not return to work, he would be
sent to a solitary confinement area. Id. at 99-100. Upon further refusal, the prison
officials followed through on their threat. Id. at 100. The prisoner filed a § 1983 com-
plaint alleging that the prison officials' negligent medical care amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 101.
45. Id. at 105-07. The deliberate indifference standard allows prisoners to present
evidence of a series of closely related incidents in order to demonstrate "deliberate indif-
ference" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, eg., Bass ex rel. Lewis v. Wallen-
stein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding prison officials liable for deficient
sick call procedures and inadequate staff); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.
1977) (finding that the cumulative effect of poor medical care by prison officials may
amount to deliberate indifference).
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site of cruel and unusual punishment."
The Estelle Court required that the conduct of the prison officials
reach a level so "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" or consti-
tute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in order to violate
the Eighth Amendment.47 In addition, the Court required that the
prisoner allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to offend "evolv-
ing standards of decency" as evidence of deliberate indifference.48 The
Court implied that prison officials need not intend indifference toward
a prisoner's serious injury in order to violate a prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights.49 The Estelle Court concluded, however, that the
inadvertent failure to supply ample medical attention does not consti-
tute unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
In 1981, the Court applied and further developed the Gregg standard
in Rhodes v. Chapman,5 holding that prison conditions were subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 2 The Rhodes Court rejected
several prisoners' contentions that housing two inmates in one cell
46. 429 U.S. at 107. At most, the doctor's failure to X-ray the prisoner's back
amounted to medical malpractice. Id. However, the Court reasoned that medical mal-
practice does not sanction a constitutional violation simply because the victim is an
inmate. Id. at 106.
47. Id. at 105-06.
48. Id. at 106. The Courts of Appeals essentially agree that mere allegations of
medical malpractice do not state a claim consistent with the deliberate indifference stan-
dard. Id. at 106 n. 14. However, the Courts of Appeals use varied terminology when
describing the conduct sufficient to state a claim. Id. See, eg., Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974) (using "deliberate indifference" to describe a physician's con-
duct which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
49. 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Court presented several alternative methods for deter-
mining if prison officials were deliberately indifferent toward the prisoner's medical
needs: (I) the prison medical staff's responsiveness to prisoner health needs; (2) the
accessibility of the medical staff to the prisoners; and (3) the failure to provide prisoners
with the treatment prescribed by the medical staff. Id.
50. Id. at 105. The Court held that allegations of medical malpractice stemming
from the doctor's negligence did not state a valid Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 107.
See Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the negligent failure
to provide medical care, evidenced by inattention or inadvertence, did not state an
Eighth Amendment claim); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 454 (N.D. Ind.
1981) (finding that a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant showed a callous
indifference to medical needs, that those needs were serious, and that the lack of treat-
ment resulted in injury), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub non. Wellman v. Faulkner,
715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
52. Id. at 344-46. The Supreme Court first considered the Eighth Amendment re-
quirements for prison conditions in Rhodes. Id. at 344-45. "Today the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, 'involve the
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comprised a condition of confinement evidencing cruel and unusual
punishment. 3 The Court stated that "double ceiling" may constitute
an infliction of pain, but reasoned that, in this instance, the pain was
neither inflicted in an unnecessary or wanton fashion nor grossly dis-
proportionate to the severity of the crime.54 The Court relied on the
fact that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.5 5
Furthermore, overcrowding did not result in deprivations of necessities
of life such as food or medical care.5 6 The Court based its opinion on
objective criteria regarding the seriousness of the prisoners' deprivation
and concluded that double celling was not sufficiently harmful to vio-
late the Eighth Amendment.57
In Whitley v. Albers, 8 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a subjec-
tive standard still applies when adjudicating prisoners' Eighth Amend-
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime... " Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
The Court further stated that '[ilt is unquestioned that '[c]onfinement in a prison...
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards.'"
Id. at 345 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)). See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (stating that a federal court's inquiry into prison management is
limited to whether the conduct violates the Constitution); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977) ("[flinding that [t]he Constitution contemplates that in the end [a
court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a
given punishment). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text discussing Eighth
Amendment challenges to the conditions of confinement.
53. 452 U.S. at 348-49.
54. Id. at 348. The Court found "double ceiling" a necessary response to the large
number of inmates at the facility. Id. In light of alleged overcrowding, prisoners were
not deprived of essential necessities, prison violence did not increase as a result of
double celling, and prison life did not become intolerable. Id. "To the extent that such
conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id. at 347.
55. Id. at 349. See also supra note 6 discussing the standards and scope of discre-
tion that courts have in determining the constitutionally-required level of comfort that
prisons must provide.
56. 452 U.S. at 348.
57. Id. at 346-47. The Rhodes Court looked to the objective findings of the district
court to determine whether prison officials violated the prisoners' Eighth Amendment
rights. Id. at 346-48. The objective question is whether the conditions of confinement
rise to the level of a "serious deprivation," while the subjective question is whether the
deprivation results from the conduct of prison officials. Martin A. Schwartz, The Deci-
sion on Prison Conditions, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1991, at 3. Because the prisoners' claims
did not meet the objective standard of sufficiently serious deprivation, the Rhodes Court
did not address the subjective issue. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
58. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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ment claims. 9 In Whitley, prison guards shot a prison inmate while
attempting to quell a disturbance.6 The prisoner alleged that such
treatment deprived the prisoner of his Eighth Amendment rights.61
The Supreme Court emphasized that only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of physical pain constituted cruel and unusual punishment.6 2
Further, the Court required that the conduct involve more than ordi-
nary lack of due care in order to qualify as cruel and unusual punish-
ment.63 The court reasoned that a higher standard applies when prison
officials take security measures to insure the safety of themselves and
the inmates.6" The Court articulated the standard in such instances as
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of caus-
ing harm.",65 In light of this standard, the Whitley Court held that the
shooting was a good faith attempt to restore security and therefore did
not violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.
66
59. Id. at 319-21. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (stating that
Whitley clarified that Rhodes did not eliminate a subjective component).
60. 475 U.S. at 316. The disturbance began when an inmate assaulted one guard
and took a second guard hostage. Id. at 314-15. While guards executed a plan to free
the hostage, another prisoner, respondent Albers, interfered. Id. at 316. Despite a
warning shot, Albers continued to interfere and the guard shot Albers in the knee. Id.
61. Id. at 317. The prisoner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 12 for the
relevant language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
62. 475 U.S. at 319. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 241 (noting that the Whitley
Court delegated wide deference to prison officials and reafflirmed the "unnecessary and
wanton" standard).
63. 475 U.S. at 319. The Court reasoned that Eighth Amendment scrutiny does not
apply to all governmental actions affecting a prisoner's well-being. Id. Relying on Es-
telle, the Court found that the infliction of pain through mere negligence did not
amount to a constitutional violation. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1976) (holding that physician's alleged malpractice did not amount to cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
64. 475 U.S. at 320. The court specifically found that the deliberate indifference
standard set forth in Estelle did not "adequately capture the importance of such com-
peting obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hind-sight deci-
sions necessarily made in haste." Id.
65. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert
denied sub nom., John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). The Supreme Court found
relevant factors such as the need of force, the nexus between the need and the amount of
force used, the extent of the injury, and the potential safety threats to prison staff and
inmates. 475 U.S. at 321.
66. Id. at 326.
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Wilson v. Seiter 67 presented the United States Supreme Court with
an opportunity to review the minimum culpable mental state which
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.68 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, stated that the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment encompasses both deprivations resulting
specifically from the sentence and those suffered as a condition of con-
finement. 69 The Court defined punishment as a deliberate effort to
chastise or deter70 and upheld the settled principal that the Eighth
Amendment applies specifically to cases of unnecessary and wanton
infliction of punishment.71 The Court reasoned the well-founded prin-
ciple that formal punishment72 is subject to Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny irrespective of intent.73 However, the court reasoned that pain
inflicted which does not result from formal punishment is subject to
inquiry into the prison official's mental state.74
The majority acknowledged that the offending conduct must be wan-
67. Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991). See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of Wilson's case history.
68. 111 S. Ct. at 2326. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text which con-
sider the level of culpability prison officials must possess to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
69. 111 S. Ct. at 2323. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, with which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Conner, Kennedy, and Souter joined.
70. Id. at 2325 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)). See also supra note 1 for the definition of
punishment.
71. Ill S. Ct. at 2323. The Court based its conclusion on the language of the
Eighth Amendment and prior Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 2323-24. See supra note
1 for text of the Eighth Amendment.
72. The Court defined formal punishment as punishment by statute or the sentenc-
ing judge. 111 S. Ct. at 2325.
73. Id. at 2323.
74. Id. Both the petitioner and the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the
petitioner, suggested that the Court distinguish between "short-term" conditions (where
the intent requirement should apply) and "continuing" or "long-term" conditions
(where intent is irrelevant). Id. The Court declined the petitioner's argument, however,
reasoning that such a distinction was significant only to the extent that it may show
knowledge and therefore intent on the part of prison officials. Id. Cf Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989) (stating that the failure to "train officers in the constitu-
tional limitations on the use of deadly force" may be characterized as a "deliberate
indifference" to constitutional rights). Moreover, the Court recognized the difficulty in
drawing a line between "short-term" and "long-term." 111 S. Ct. at 2325. Cf McCar-
thy v. Bronson, 111 S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41 (1991) (providing that isolated or widespread
incidents of alleged unconstitutional conduct support an allegation of unconstitutional
treatment).
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ton.7" However, once the prisoner proves that the conduct is harmful
enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment
claim, the court reasoned that the "wantonness" of the conduct de-
pends on the constraints facing the prison officials.76 Justice Scalia dis-
tinguished challenges lodged against prison officials' specific acts under
pressure from challenges to the general conditions of confinement.77
The Court stated that prisoners challenging conditions of confinement
must prove deliberate indifference7 on behalf of the prison officials to
meet the requisite "wantonness., 7 9
After establishing the applicability of the deliberate indifference stan-
dard, Justice Scalia concluded that the lower courts erred in applying
the higher malicious and sadistic standard prescribed by Whitley." In
order to confirm that the lower courts would reach the same decision
based upon the Court's deliberate indifference standard, the Court va-
cated the prior judgment and remanded the case."
75. 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
76. Id. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) is the case setting forth objective
criteria in Eighth Amendment cases. See supra notes 51-57 for a discussion of Rhodes.
Once the objective standard is met, the prisoner must then prove the requisite subjective
component when challenging conditions of confinement. 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
77. Id. Classifying conduct as cruel and unusual depends upon the totality of the
circumstances. See West, supra note 2, at 215 n.44 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981)). Conduct classified as cruel and unusual punishment under
normal conditions may not be cruel and unusual under conditions of a prison riot. Id.
at 220-21.
78. The "deliberate indifference" standard was first established in Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Estelle. The standard established in Estelle for adjudicating claims of insufficient
medical care is equally applicable to claims challenging prison conditions. Ill S. Ct. at
2326-27. The Court reasoned that medical treatment is as much a "condition of con-
finement" as the quality of food an inmate is fed, the clothes he is given, the temperature
of his cell, and the protection against harm from other inmates. Id.
79. 111 S. Ct. at 2326. In "emergency" situations, the Court stated that "wanton-
ness consisted of acting 'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."' Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In Wilson, both
parties agreed that the higher standard established in Whitley was not applicable to a
claim challenging confinement conditions. 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
80. Id. at 2327-28. The Court expressed no opinion on the relative merits of the
various individual claims. Id. at 2327. However, the Court did reject the petitioner's
contention that a challenge may not be dismissed while other disputed challenges re-
main unresolved. Id. "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human
need exists." Id.
81. Id. at 2328. Referring to the lower court's finding that petitioner's claims were
"'[a]t best... negligence,'" the Court determined that the misapplication of the stan-
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Justice White, concurring in judgment only,8 2 rejected the majority's
position that prisoners must show deliberate indifference on the part of
the responsible officials to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim
challenging the conditions of confinement.8 3 Justice White agreed with
the majority's view that any pain inflicted pursuant to a specific court
order or statute was subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny regardless
of intent.8 4 However, the concurrence disagreed with the majority's
assertion that pain inflicted by virtue of prison conditions violated the
Eighth Amendment only upon a showing of intent.8 5 The concurrence
reasoned that prior decisions of the Court have held that prison condi-
tions are encompassed within the punishment imposed by a judge or
through a statute.8 6 Justice White concluded that an intent require-
dard was most likely harmless. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th
Cir. 1990)). However, the Court reasoned that if the lower court had applied the cor-
rect deliberate indifference standard, it may have reconsidered its finding of mere negli-
gence because the determination was essential to the judgment. 111 S. Ct. at 2328.
82. Justice White was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, concur-
ring in judgment only. Id.
83. Id. (White, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. 111 S. Ct. at 2330. Justice White argued that intent would be difficult to prove
in situations involving an institution. Id. White expressed concern that the intent re-
quirement could be avoided by prison officials simply by alleging inadequate funding.
Id. However, the majority observed that there was no indication that prison officials
sought to use a "[cost] defense to avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976)." 111 S. Ct. at 2326. See supra note 8 explaining the distinction between issues
of funding and those of prison conditions. See also McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844
(5th Cir. 1991) (prison administrators asserting that insufficient funding was sufficient
justification for forcing prisoner to live in backed up sewage). Further, White suggested
that states, having chosen imprisonment as a punishment should comply with the
"'contemporary standard of decency' required by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at
2330-31.
86. 111 S. Ct. at 2330. The concurrence referred specifically to Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 1122 (1979) in suggesting that prior case law clearly indicated that the punishment
inflicted upon the prisoner encompassed all of the conditions of confinement. Id. at
2328-30.
In Hutto, the Court only considered whether "punitive isolation" amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment. 437 U.S. at 685. The Wilson concurrence interpreted Hutto
as a clear cut rule defining conditions of confinement as punishment. 111 S. Ct. at 2328.
However, the majority stated that Hutto did not address whether the conditions of con-
finement remedied by the lower court constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
2325 n.2.
In Rhodes, the Court addressed whether the alleged conditions of confinement were
serious enough to reach constitutional deprivation. 452 U.S. at 346-47. According to
the Wilson concurrence, Rhodes clearly articulated that conditions of confinement are
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ment was unnecessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment challenge to
conditions of confinement.8 7 Moreover, the concurring justices be-
lieved that the intent requirement was unwise and impossible to
apply.8 8
The majority's holding that the petitioner must show that prison offi-
cials were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his incarceration
was correct for three reasons. First, the Eighth Amendment, which
expressly protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, man-
dates an intent requirement.8 9 By definition, punishment is a deliberate
act inflicted for some penalogical purpose, such as chastising or deter-
ring a prisoner.' A prison official's acts constitute cruel and unusual
to be treated like formal punishment for purposes of Eighth Amendment challenges.
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329-30. Conversely, the Wilson majority found no support for
the concurring view. Id. at 2325 n.2.
The Wilson concurrence found it important that the lower courts, consistent with the
concurring opinion, often examined only the objective conditions and not the subjective
intent of prison officials when assessing Eighth Amendment challenges. Id. at 2330 n. 1
(citing Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 1990) (looking at the totality of the
conditions to determine cruel and unusual punishment); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52,
54-55 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the treatment of a prisoner while in confinement
embodies punishment and is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny); French v. Owens,
777 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1985) (examining the totality of conditions of confine-
ment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating that prisoners have a constitutional right to safe conditions of con-
finement and, if dangerous, those conditions create cruel and unusual punishment).
87. 111 S. Ct. at 2330. The concurrence criticized the majority's reliance on
Resweber, Estelle, and Whitley, stating that they were not cases challenging the condi-
tions of confinement but rather challenges to specific acts aimed at individual prisoners.
Id.
The majority discounted this criticism and found "no basis whatever for saying that
[deprivation inflicted upon all prisoners] is a 'condition of confinement' and [deprivation
inflicted upon a specific prisoner] is not - much less that the one constitutes 'punish-
ment' and the other does not." Wilson, Ill S. Ct. at 2324 n.1. For example, in Estelle,
if an individual was deprived of adequate medical care, that deprivation was a condition
of his confinement. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
88. 111 S. Ct. at 2330. The concurrence found that the majority opinion departed
from case law and created a requirement impossible to administer. Id. The concur-
rence reasoned that most constitutional deprivations result from the culmination of var-
ious acts over an extended period of time. Id. Furthermore, because these cumulative
actions were committed by numerous people, the concurrence argued that it would be
difficult to determine whose intent to measure. Id.
89. Id. at 2325. "If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by
the statute or sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting
officer before it can qualify [as an Eighth Amendment violation]." Id. See supra note 1
for the text of the Eighth Amendment.
90. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990); See also Wilson v. Seiter,
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punishment only when the prison official intended the acts as punish-
ment for a penal or disciplinary purpose.91 Therefore, a mental ele-
ment must attach to conditions of confinement in order for the
treatment to constitute punishment.
Second, the "deliberate indifference" standard is both a practical and
logical extension of the standard established in Estelle.92 The exten-
sion is practical because it requires a lesser degree of culpability than
cases of physical infliction of pain.9a An inmate satisfies the Eighth
Amendment's intent requirement merely by showing a series of events
which, viewed in their totality, amount to a pattern of deliberate indif-
ference which deprives the inmate of a single human need.94 Further-
more, the extension of the deliberate indifference standard from the
cases of inadequate medical care to cases challenging confinement con-
ditions presents a logical progression. For example, the medical care a
prisoner receives is as much a condition of his confinement as is the
food he is fed and the protection he receives against other inmates. 95
Third, the circumstances facing prison officials vary and their con-
duct in maintaining the safety and security of their facilities varies in
response.96 The competing institutional concerns at issue when offi-
cials allegedly inflict cruel and unusual punishment determine the wan-
tonness of that conduct.97 The inefficacy of applying the same
standard to a claim arising from actions taken to quell a riot and to a
claim arising from poor medical care mandates the application of a
11l S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991) (defining punishment as "a deliberate act intended to chas-
tise or deter").
91. 111 S. Ct. at 2325. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985) ("[I]f the guard accidentally stepped on the prisoner's toe and broke it, this would
not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word. .
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
92. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Estelle.
93. 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (finding that the higher state of mind required in prison riot
cases does not apply to prison condition cases).
94. Id. at 2327 (finding that a long duration of cruel prison conditions may make it
easier to establish the requisite intent). See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.
1977) (stating that the cumulative effect of poor medical care amounted to deliberate
indifference); accord Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that the totality of the incidents of violence against a prisoner amounted to
deliberate indifference), aff'd, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990).
95. 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
96. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
97. Id. See also Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
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varying standard of culpability." As competing institutional concerns
dissipate, the standard for wantonness drops from "malicious and sa-
distic" to the level of "deliberate indifference." 99
Wilson correctly recognizes the importance of establishing a variable
standard of culpability. However, the Court fails to provide lower
courts with the necessary guidelines to use in balancing the competing
concerns against the conduct of prison officials.1"° The Court makes
no attempt to articulate the requirements forper se "deliberate indiffer-
ence."'01 Although the deliberate indifference standard is more lenient
than the malicious and sadistic standard"0 2 and affords greater protec-
tion from unconstitutional conditions, 0 3 the Supreme Court failed to
provide the lower courts with criteria for determining the appropriate
level of culpability in a given set of circumstances."° As a result,
courts lack the tools necessary to control the number of prisoner rights
claims and to render consistent results.
The Wilson court takes an additional step toward broadening Eighth
Amendment application."0 5 Establishment of an intention to chastise
or deter is a necessary predicate to a finding that the actions of a prison
98. 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
99. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 243 (agreeing that prison officials must possess the
freedom to quickly respond to riots in order to effectively control prisoners and prevent
further mishaps). See also, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (discussing various
situations that would constitute deliberate indifference).
100. See Wilson, I1l S. Ct. at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (stating that the major-
ity's intent requirement will prove impossible to apply).
101. Schwartz, supra note 57, at 3.
102. 111 S. Ct. at 2326. But see Schwartz, supra note 57, at 3 (it may be unclear
whose intent must be shown, and thus it will be more difficult for a prisoner to make his
claim).
103. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27. A prisoner does not have to show a physical
injury to prove deliberate indifference; therefore, it is easier to demonstrate an Eighth
Amendment claim. Id.
104. Id. at 2331. Some commentators argue that Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority, omitted a definition of "deliberate indifference" in order to secure a majority
decision. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 3.
105. See West, supra note 2, at 209-12 (stating that the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishment" found within the Eighth Amendment defies precise definition). "A princi-
ple to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth." Id. (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). See also Durkin,
supra note 5, at 251 (stating that the "Eighth Amendment has evolved to an extent
where it may accommodate more subtle notions of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment").
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official constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 6 By allowing relief
to a prisoner who shows that prison officials were deliberately indiffer-
ent to the conditions of his confinement, the Supreme Court properly
gives prisoners additional means to protect themselves from unconsti-
tutional deprivations arising outside of formal punishment. However,
despite the Court's good intentions, the Wilson standard is vague and
offers no guidelines for lower courts to follow, thus adding to the con-
fusion and accumulation of Eighth Amendment claims.
Richard H. Kuhlman*
106. Wilson, I ll S. Ct. at 2325. The requirement of intent is based on the language
of the Eighth Amendment and on the definition of the word "punishment."
* J.D. 1993, Washington University.
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